Abstract-M ultipath routing does not minimize the consequences of security attacks. Due to this many WSNs are still in danger of most security attacks even when mult ipath routing is used. In critical situations, for example, in military and health applications this may lead to undesired, harmful and disastrous effects. These applications need to get their data communicated efficiently and in a secure manner. In this p aper, we show the results of a series of security attacks on a multipath extension to the ad hoc on-demand distance vector AODV protocol, AOM DV. It is proved that many security parameters are negatively affected by security attacks on AOM DV, which is contradictory to research claims. This means that alternative refinements have to be made to present multipath routing protocols in order to make them more effective against network security attacks.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of wireless data communicat ion, routing is of p ivotal importance in getting info rmation fro m one node to another. Getting information fro m one place in a wireless sensor network, usually fro m the data collecting nodes or source to the base station or sink is the primary objective. Ho wever, in military and med ical applicat ions [13] , just getting the data across the network is not the only desired focus. In these applications security is of utmost importance due to the sensitive nature of the data that is transported. Hence, in formation security measures must be placed in these types of WSNs.
Multipath routing was initially designed to accommodate network failures, where allo wing mult iple ways to transport data across the network ensured no break in data transfer during path, node, environmental failures etc. A multipath routing algorithm is used to find the maximal nu mber of paths between a single sourcedestination pair. Multipath routing aims to take advantage of the connectivity redundancies of the underlying physical networks by providing mult iple paths between source-destination pairs [11] . Ho wever, this technique has its drawbacks, fo r examp le, excessive use of bandwidth, use of extra co mputing resources to eliminated duplicate messages, increased latency, message delays etc. Most WSN source routing protocols, for example, dynamic source routing (DSR) [4] and ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [10] , [6] have a mu ltipath variant, mu ltimed ia mu ltipath dynamic source routing (MMDSR) [2] and ad hoc on-demand mu ltipath distance vector protocol (AOMDV) [18] , [1] . The route discovery process in the multipath protocols may be init iated either when the act ive path collapses where further commun ication is performed with one of the alternative paths, or when all known paths towards the destination are broken [20] , known as comp lete mu ltipath routing. The route discovery may stop when a sufficient number of paths are discovered or when all possible paths are detected. Multipath routing protocols can be nodedisjoint [12] or link-d isjoint [14] if a node (or a lin k) cannot participate in more than one path between two end nodes.
Inherently mu ltipath routing protocols were not designed with security as a primary objective. However, some authors [7] argue that security mechanis ms are not needed in mu ltipath routing protocols because the use of many paths overcome the ‗majority' of security issues faced by wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Recently, mu ltipath routing algorith ms have been introduced to enhance data confidentiality in ad hoc wireless networks [19] , [3] , [21] , [17] . Intuitively, mult ipath routing algorith ms are simp le and efficient because no encryption is needed and data is -split‖ among different routes to minimize or even disable potential captures by unauthorized users [23] . Mult ipath routing min imizes the consequences of security attacks deriving fro m collaborating malicious nodes in MANET, by maximizing the nu mber of nodes that an adversary must compro mise in order to take control of the communicat ion [16] . I would argue that even though this may be the case, security awareness still has to be built into such protocols in order for them to obtain the full benefit of transporting data from the source to the destination node. Further, the concept of mu ltipath is refined in that even though a source can use mult iple paths to get data to the desired destination, only one is actually used at any given point in time. Fro m a security standpoint this means that only one alternative path is selected and used when a network layer security attack occurs. The routing protocols have to be energy and memory efficient but at the same time they have to be robust to security attacks and node failu res. Fro m th is perspective, eight WSN security parameters, availab ility, reliability, integrity, accessibility, survivability, responsiveness, selfhealingness and resilience [7] are deemed as being important in the context of WSNs. These parameters define the security level of the WSN. They are defined by network performance measures and are indicat ive as to the overall security ‗health' or ‗well-being' of the WSN. Hence, a security threat is defined whenever one of these parameters is affected negatively.
This work focuses on the performance of the AOMDV routing protocol when exposed to security threats for WSNs. The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, wireless sensor network-based security parameters are presented. In section 3, AODV is introduced and explained together with its mult ipath extension AOMDV. Section 4 gives the experimental setup and simu lations of the proposed methodology, while finally section 4 gives the advantages and disadvantages of using SA-AOMDV, with the conclusions.
II. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK-BASED SECURITY PARAMETERS
The following security parameters can be used for measuring security attacks in WSNs:
Availability-reliability-resiliency-self-healing:
These WSN security parameters are given as the most important security requirements in critical WSN applications [7] . Availability ensures that services and informat ion can be accessed at the time they are required. Reliab ility guarantees that data will be delivered to the destination, even in the face of threats. Resiliency ensures that the network will tolerate attacks while continuing to offer un interrupted services. Self-healing deals with the ability to recover fro m security problems and isolate the source of the threat, ensuring continued availability.
Integrity and freshness of data:
These parameters verify that the data has not been altered maliciously while freshness deals with the fact that the data is up-to-date. Is source nodes send inaccurate data to the sinks then erroneous and harmful decision making will result, especially in sensitive applications, such as, health care and pollution monitoring, which relies heavily on the integrity and freshness of the information sent to them.
Authentication:
Authentication verifies the identity of the participants in WSN mote co mmunication. Hence intruders can be distinguished fro m leg itimate nodes. We place authentication third on the security requirements list as even if data is availability, integrity and freshness, we need to be sure that the trusted node has seen the packet and it has come fro m the node who has claimed to send it. It protects the network fro m malicious nodes who may inject false data into the network.
The methods used to evaluate network security metric parameter performance during a network attack are listed in Table 1 . 
III. AD HOC ON-DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR MULTIPATH ROUTING PROTOCOL

A. AODV
The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is intended for use by nodes in an ad hoc network. AODV is a Reactive or on Demand routing protocol. It uses bi-direct ional links and a Route discovery cycle is used for route finding. There is also a route Maintenance phase of active routes. Sequence numbers are used for loop prevention and as an indicator for route freshness criteria. AODV provides unicast and mu lticast co mmunication. AODV ut ilizes routing tables to store routing information. Typically a node stores a routing table for unicast routes and a routing table for multicast routes.
For each destination, a node maintains a list of precursor nodes, to route through them. Precursor nodes help in route maintenance. When a node wishes to send a packet to some destination it checks its routing table to determine if it has a current route to the destination. If it does, the node forwards the packet, via broadcast flooding, to next hop node. If not, it init iates a route discovery process. Route discovery process begins with After the destination node receives the RREQ packet, using the reverse route a node can send a RREP (Route Reply packet) to the source. In order to respond to RREQ a node should have in its route table, (1) unexp ired entry for the destination and (2) sequence number of destination at least as great as in RREQ (for loop prevention). If both conditions are met and the IP address of the destination matches with that in RREQ, the node responds to RREQ by sending a RREP back using unicasting and not flooding to the source using reverse path. If conditions are not satisfied, then source node increments the hop count in RREQ and broadcasts to its neighbours. After processing the RREP, the node forwards it towards the source. Route Erro r (RERR) is in itiated by the node upstream (closer to the source) of the break. It is propagated to all the affected destinations. RERR lists all the nodes affected by the link failure, that is, nodes that were using the lin k to route messages (precursor nodes). When a node receives an RERR, it marks its route to the destination as invalid by setting the distance to the destination as infinity in the route table. When a source node receives a RRER, it can rein itiate the route discovery. Link failure detection is enabled with Hello messages, where neighboring nodes periodically exchange hello message. Therefore, the absence of hello message is used as an indication of link failure. Alternatively, failure to receive several MAC-level acknowledgements may be used as an indication of link failure.
B. AOMDV
AOMDV is a mult ipath routing protocol. It is an extension to AODV and also provides two main services i.e. route d iscovery and maintenance. Unlike A ODV, every RREP is being considered by the source node and thus mult iple paths discovered in one route discovery. Being the hop-by-hop routing protocol, the intermed iate nodes maintain mu lt iple path entries in their respective routing table. The route entry table at each node also contains a list of next hop along with the corresponding hop counts. Every node maintains an advertised hop count for the destination. Route advertisements of the destination are sent using this hop count. An alternate path to the destination is accepted by a node if the hop count is less than the advertised hop count for the destination.
AOMDV provide all intermed iate nodes in the primary route with alternative paths. Thus, when the route is broken, the intermediate nodes can be rescued by alternative paths. There is one common feature in most existing multipath routing protocols -among all routes, one is for use and the others are in the wait ing list. When the current route is broken, another one is chosen to be the route from the waiting list. Figure 4 shows how AOMDV will react to a network security attack. In this case when node G is compro mised, AOMDV will continue sending data along route S-C-B-I-D. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the AOMDV routing protocol, we used the ns-2 simulator. The ns-2 simulator has been used extensively in evaluating the performance of ad hoc 
A. Evaluation Metrics
The following WSN perfo rmance evaluation parameters were used:
The throughput capacity is the number of bits per second that can be transmitted by every node to its destination. [1] 2. Delay:
The delay of a packet in a network is the time it takes the packet to reach the destination after it leaves the source. We do not take queueing delay at the source into account, since our interest is in the network delay. [1] 3. Packet loss:
The *Type-P-One-way-Packet-Loss* fro m Source to Destination at T is 1<< means that the Source sent the first bit of a type-P packet to Destination at wire -time T and that Destination did not receive that packet. [8] 
B. Blackhole attacks
This attack is prevalent in WSNs and because it drops all packets destined for a particular destination is termed a blackhole attack. A blackhole attack occurs when a mote (internal blackhole) that is within the topology of the WSN or an outsider mote (external blackhole) inserts itself with a route to the sink that advertises itself as having the most lucrative to neighbourhood motes in forwarding their data packets to the destination mote. It does this by advertising itself to neighbours with the highest sequence number and lo west hop count. In this way neighboring motes are spoofed into believing that the blackhole mote offers a better path to the destination. They subsequently send their packets to the blackhole mote which drop all data packets. The mote establishes itself during the route discovery phase, by replying to RREQ messages with false RREP messages, with h igh sequence numbers and the lowest hop count to the destination mote. During data transmission the blackhole attack drops all data packets; hence the source mote and the destination mote are unable to commun icate with each other.
In on-demand WSN routing protocols, blackhole attacks may target the route discovery phase. During route setup the rogue mote advertises a higher quality route to the sink compared to the other motes in its neighbourhood. It will do this by placing a lower hop count value in the route reply (RREP) packet destined to the source mote. The result will be that the source mote will be spoofed into believ ing that the blackhole mote has the best path to the desired destination. In all further communicat ion to this destination mote, data packets will be sent via the blackhole mote. The blackhole mote acts by discarding all received packets. In single path routing protocols, where there may be many route discovery calls, compared to mult i-path routing protocols, the blackhole attack may be more prevalent as there are more opportunities for the attacker to assert itself during the route discovery phase.
C. Simulation results
The network is configured with four sinks. Network attacks occur at 20-25s, 50-5s and 65-74s. Shown on the graphs are the output metric results for each of the sinks.
Throughput: Figure 7 shows the same network simu lation but in this case there are three security attacks. The first has a duration of five seconds, the second attack has a duration of one second and the last had a duration of nine seconds. As seen the troughs in the graphs shows severe drops in throughput during the attacks. The effect on the network was so disastrous that in attacks lasting than more than one second, no data packets were transferred. In the case where the attack lasted one second, the throughput dropped from 200 Kbits/s to 145 Kbits/s. This is still a severe drop in throughput. Delay: Figure 8 shows the minimu m delay was 18s with a maximu m delay of 44s. The average delay was around 30s. The graph shows that the time taken fo r network data packets to traverse the network was relatively stable. The minor changes in delay could be attributed to changes in wireless network conditions. When the network is under attack maximu m delay of 475s were found (cf. Figure 9 ). For short attacks, for example, the one lasting one second the delay went from 27s to 50s. For the delay lasting five seconds the maximu m delay was found peaking at 475s fro m 25s. For the longest attack lasting nine s econds the peak delay was 347s.
Packet loss: On Figure 10 is shown that the minimu m packet losses were 20 packets, wh ile the maximu m packet losses were 210 packets. The average packet loss was around 85 packets. In a wireless environment the packet losses were as expected, varying according to network conditions. Figure 11 shows that packet losses were consistent with that shown in Figure 10 , except for three spikes. These spikes occurred just after the network was attacked. The first spike corresponded to the five second network attack and 750 packets were lost, whereas in the one second attack, a spike of 250 packets was observed. Finally for the nine second attack, a packet loss of 800 packets was seen. 
D. Discussions
The negative effects of security attacks on network performance parameters shows that multipath routing alone is not enough to protect a WSN. The network throughput is severely affected and this means that the security measure availab ility is breached. In situations where high performance is required this can be a very unsatisfactory outcome. Even though there are many different paths carrying the data packets, an attack shows that when one path is down the actual throughput to the sink drops and this finding does not support the argument that availability is unaffected by using a mu ltipath protocol. It shows that even though data packets are still Delay sensitive applications will be affected by security attacks in mult ipath environment. The literature states that delay should lessen under a security attack, when using a multipath protocol. A longer path may be under attack, hence when a network is under attack the shorter paths will get used, hence reducing the overall network delay. The results show that the delay increases when a network attack occurs. This happens as longer paths get selected, hence the delay would increase. Of course, the delay would depend on the ratio of longer to shorter path and if this is used as a routing metric. The delay would be determined by when the network is attacked, depending on if the attack is on a short path or longer path and if the switching is to a longer or shorter path. To the authors knowledge very little work has been done in this area, but primary results indicate that delay increases in multipath environments under attack.
Packet loss is fairly consistent for the cases of normal and ‗under attack' network condit ions. However, the large increases in packet losses just after an attack can be attributed to the switching to shorter more efficient paths after the attack. When this is done there is a natural loss of data packets in the network.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors show that research findings about the added security of multipath routing may be a myth. This is shown by a set of empirical simu lated testing. The AOMDV routing protocol was used for testing in a WSN. The results show that network throughput and delay were negatively affected by network attacks, while packet loss remained fairly unaffected. The high importance of throughput and delay in resource intensive WSN applications means that immediate measures must be put into place for proper security mechanisms to be implemented in multipath routing protocols. This would enhance the use of such applications making them more effective, efficient and security-aware.
